Governments often delegate aspects of regulatory enforcement to third-party firms that sell compliance-related services to regulated buyers. Competition in the resulting compliance markets may generate social costs and benefits: it can lead to lower prices and better choices for buyers, but may induce sellers to help buyers evade regulations. This paper quantifies this tradeoff in the market for passenger vehicle emissions tests in Texas. Test-level administrative data shows that thousands of testing firms falsified more than 7 million tests between 2002 and 2024. Quasi-random increases in competition cause more cheating, which allows drivers to avoid repairs that would causally decrease their vehicles' emissions of harmful air pollutants. To understand how much competition benefits consumers and causes externalities in equilibrium, I estimate a supply model of cheating and fair tests and a dynamic discrete choice model of demand for tests among differentiated stations, as well as for repairs.
(with Ben Lockwood and Arthur van Benthem)
Dockless, shared e-bikes and scooters are a rapidly-growing segment of the local transportation market despite being taxed at higher rates per mile of travel than many conventional transportation modes, including motor vehicles. This paper asks what the optimal tax rate for shared bikes and scooters would be when accounting for environmental externalities and redistribution. We derive a sufficient-statistics model that describes how optimal tax rates depend on both extensive-margin (number of trips) and intensive-margin (duration of trips) demand responses to price changes, as well as the income of bike and scooter users and net externalities relative to other travel modes. We estimate the parameters of this model using trip-level data from Lime, a large bike and scooter company, and find that in several U.S. cities, use of their vehicles is concentrated among low-income individuals. The model accordingly suggests that policymakers in these cities might want to subsidize shared bike and scooter use substantially more than what can be justified by the modest positive externalities it generates by displacing trips by motor vehicles.
Energy efficiency disclosure in multifamily housing
Asymmetric information between home buyers and sellers may reduce owners' incentives to invest in energy-conserving upgrades: when buyers cannot perfectly differentiate high- and low-efficiency buildings, sellers are unable to fully pass on the up-front cost of energy-related upgrades, and so face weaker incentives to make these upgrades. Local governments in many large U.S. cities have correspondingly passed legislation requiring public disclosure of energy use for large buildings. Do these laws improve energy efficiency, and if so, why? This paper first simulates a model of building owners' dynamic decision about when and how much to invest in upgrading their building's energy efficiency to show that steady-state building energy use is sensitive to information provision only when the extent of information provision about building efficiency affects the capitalization of energy efficiency in unit prices. I therefore investigate whether energy disclosure laws in New York City have affected unit prices, sale frequencies, and efficiency-related renovations in regulated multifamily buildings, using a regression discontinuity design. The effect of the policy on unit prices and sales is null and imprecise, which makes it difficult to conclude that the policy provided new information to buyers, but disclosure caused a 60% increase in boiler-related renovations in between 2016 and 2020.